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RETHINKING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
A STRENGTHENED CHECK ON UNFETTERED
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING ABROAD
Kelly L. Cowan*
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing threat of terrorism and the rapidly changing
landscape of war have renewed constitutional questions re-
garding the United States president's and Congress's role in
declaring and conducting war.' The War Powers Resolution,2
enacted over a presidential veto in 1973, sets forth procedures
to address the inconsistencies that have arisen between the
Constitution's text and its application.3 However, due to the
War Powers Resolution's4 varied failures in the past,5 changes
need to be made to the statute for it to become a more effec-
tive tool for controlling war powers.'
In the absence of a declaration of war, the Resolution es-
tablishes a framework intended to guarantee Congress an
active role in decisions concerning the deployment of United
States Armed Forces.' The statute provides that the presi-
dent must consult with Congress before committing troops to
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Economics, University of Colorado.
1. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278 (Aspen Law &
Business 2001).
2. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000). The entire War Powers Resolution is codified
in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548.
3. Note, Realism, Liberalism, and the War Powers Resolution, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 637, 637 (1989) (detailing the history of the War Powers Resolution).
4. The terms "War Powers Resolution" and "Resolution" will be used inter-
changeably throughout this comment.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See discussion infra Part V.
7. See John Kimpflen, War Powers of Federal and State Governments, 78
AM. JUR. 2D War § 14 (2003) (detailing the president's power under the War
Powers Resolution).
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hostile situations abroad.8 The statute further provides that
United States troops be withdrawn from the dispute within
sixty days, unless Congress authorizes longer involvement in
the dispute.9
The Resolution's existence has been burdened with con-
troversy and deliberation concerning its constitutionality and
effectiveness.'1 As influential global changes impact the
United States, it is necessary to reconsider whether the Reso-
lution is constitutional," operative, and valuable in the na-
tion's altered political landscape.
In Part II, this comment introduces the general constitu-
tional provisions giving effect to the underlying structural
conception of separation of powers and explores the constitu-
tional issues surrounding and giving rise to the statute.12
Part II further details the history and effects of the War Pow-
ers Resolution, including the United States' involvement in
Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and more recently in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and through actions against terrorist
groups. 3 In Part III, this comment explains the contempo-
rary relevant legal significance of the War Powers Resolu-
tion." In Part IV, this comment weighs the War Powers
Resolution's constitutionality and effectiveness." This analy-
sis largely centers on the debate among constitutional schol-
ars of the Framers' original intent behind the distribution of
16
war powers.
Finally, this comment concludes with Part V, proposing
that the War Powers Resolution is an acceptable measure
taken by Congress to interpret the Constitution and ensure
the existence of proper checks and balances within the United
States federal government. 7 Part V also proposes that a
8. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000).
9. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2000).
10. See Note, supra note 3, at 637.
11. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 134 (1984). Carter's final assertion is the Resolution is
needed to balance the tension between presidential and Congressional war
making power. Id. He also states that the Resolution "still has a considerable
distance to grow." Id.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See id.
17. See discussion infra Part V.
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strengthened War Powers Resolution is necessary to meet the
growing need for the United States' involvement in multilat-
eral international policy. 8 This comment lastly asserts that
such changes to the Resolution can be effectuated either
through amendments to the statute, stronger congressional
action, or judicial interpretation of the Resolution's provi-
sions."
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Constitutional Provisions Concerning the
Separation ofPowers
Underlying every provision of the United States Consti-
tution is the textual argument that each of the three
branches of government should check the others' powers."
More particularly within the federal government, each
branch's powers with respect to waging war are explicitly
stated in the Constitution, although many questions are still
raised from the general war power provisions.2'
1. The Executive War Power
The executive power is vested in the president, who is
designated as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States."22 The president holds no legal
authority to start or declare war" and this constraint is rec-
ognized against foreign nations and domestic states. 4 The
18. See discussion infra Part VI.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). "It is the intention
of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the gov-
ernment - the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial - shall be, in its
sphere, independent of the others." Id. at 147.
21. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 281. The president's authority in
waging war is provided for in Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, and Con-
gress's authority in waging war is provided for in Article I, section 8 of the Con-
stitution.
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
23. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11. "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." Id.
24. See, e.g., Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124 (1871). A business transaction
was made between merchants from different states during the Civil War. One
merchant did not receive compensation and demanded the payment of the
money. The question was whether the states were to be considered enemies at
the time. The court held that
[w]e are clearly of the opinion, from the above decisions, and our
2004
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president also lacks powers that are legislative in nature,
such as the allocation and appropriation of materials and fa-
cilities for the armed forces.25
On the other hand, the president does have the power to
recognize the existence of a state of war26 forced upon the
United States, and to determine whether war has been initi-
ated by invasion of a foreign entity into the United States.27
In these particular cases, the president is permitted to resist
by force and respond to the challenge without waiting for spe-
cial legislative authorization.28
Acting in the capacity as commander in chief, the presi-
dent has the legal authority to conduct war after a declara-
tion is made by Congress.29 Thus, the president carries into
effect all laws passed by Congress to conduct war once it is
declared, to regulate the armed forces, and to define and pun-
ish all offenses against the rights that exist between na-
tions.3 ° Furthermore, as commander in chief, the president is
empowered to direct the military forces and deploy them in
any appropriate manner."
understanding and construction of the Constitution of the United
States, that the late rebellion did not become a civil war until it was
made such by the proclamation of the President, on the 16th of Au-
gust, 1861, made in pursuance of the act of Congress of the 13th of
July, 1861, and that prior to that date, commercial intercourse be-
tween the citizens of Louisiana and the State of Indiana was lawful
and would constitute a legal and valid consideration.
Id. at 139-40.
25. See Kimpflen, supra note 7.
26. See, e.g., Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7 (1875). The issue in this case
surrounded the question of "whether a partnership, where one member of the
firm resided in New York and the others in Louisiana, was dissolved by the war
of the rebellion prior to April 23, 1861." Id. at 9. The Court held that "it may
and shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to declare that the in-
habitants of such State, or any section or part thereof where such insurrection
exists, are in a state of insurrection against the United States...." Id. at 12-
13.
27. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635 (1862). Three ships sailed in wa-
ters during a blockade and claimed they were unaware of the war when they
were captured as enemies' property. The fourth ship claimed it was intending
to receive a permit to go to sea and while anchored, it was taken. The Court
found that the president had a right to institute a blockade of ports in posses-
sion of persons in armed rebellion against the government and that the vessels
were bound to regard the blockades. Id. at 698-99.
28. Id. at 668.
29. See Kimpflen, supra note 7.
30. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1850).
31. Id.
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2. The Legislative War Power
Congress alone holds a significant amount of legal au-
thority in exercising its war and defense powers. 2 Under the
United States Constitution, Congress holds the power to de-
clare war.3 However, this power is only limited to situations
in which war is being used to vindicate the rights of the gov-
ernment and its constituents.34
Under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, Congress is
also charged with providing the common defense for the na-
tion."3 The section also vests in Congress the sole power to
raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy.
3 6
Finally, Congress holds the power to "make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water.
"
01
3. The Judiciary and the Political Question Doctrine
Throughout the history of the United States, very few
cases involving the federal government's war power have
come before the Court, due in large part to judicially self-
imposed justiciability limits." The justiciability of a case de-
pends on whether a judicial resolution of the controversy
"would be consonant with the separation of powers principles
embodied in the Constitution, to which all courts must adhere
even in the absence of an explicit statutory command."39 The
most relevant limit to the War Powers Resolution is the po-
litical question doctrine.
32. See Donald Kramer, Police Power, 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law
§ 318 (2004).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("[t]he Congress shall have the Power...
to declare War").
34. See Fleming, 50 U.S. at 614.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The "common defense for the nation" refers to
what Congress may implement for the nation through its legislative process. A
major example is Congress's power to provide for the allocation of materials and
facilities for defense. See Kimpflen, supra note 7.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13 (stating "[t]he Congress shall have the
Power... to raise and support Armies... [and] to provide and maintain a
Navy").
37. Id. at cl. 11.
38. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 83-84.
39. Donald T. Kramer, Departmental Separation of Governmental Powers,
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 265 (2003).
40. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 292. The other self-made justiciable
limits created by the courts are: prohibition of advisory opinions, standing,
ripeness, and mootness. Id. at 28. These limits have also created constraints
for courts hearing cases involving the war powers. Id. at 292.
2004
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Under the political question doctrine, no case or contro-
versy is heard by a court when the parties solely seek adjudi-
cation of a political question.4' Political questions involve le-
gal claims that are based on public policy decisions that are
constitutionally reserved to other branches of the federal gov-
ernment or state governments.42  Dismissal for non-
justiciability under the political question doctrine is appro-
priate when one of the following circumstances are met: a
textual constitutional commitment of an issue to another po-
litical department, few judicially discoverable standards for
resolving an issue, policy determinations tied in with the de-
cision of an issue, disrespect for another branch of govern-
ment in light of a decision's holding, questioning of a political
decision that has already been made, or the potential for em-
barrassment resulting from mixed pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on a single question. 3 If a case presents any
one of the above characteristics, it will be deemed non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine and a court
will not hear it."
The political question doctrine demonstrates that courts
have declined to hear most cases involving the War Powers
Resolution because the Resolution and the war powers in
41. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
No justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek
adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are
asking for an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be
adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, and
when there is no standing to maintain the action. Yet justicia-
bility is not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of
scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many
subtle pressures.
Id. at 95.
42. See Kramer, supra note 39.
43. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
44. Id. at 217.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case
at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the
ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which
we treat is one of "political questions," not one of "political
cases." The courts cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona fide
controversy as to whether some action denominated "political"
exceeds constitutional authority. The cases we have reviewed
show the necessity for discriminating inquiry into the precise
facts and posture of the particular case, and the impossibility of
resolution by any semantic cataloguing.
Vol: 45104
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general belong to the legislative and executive branches of
the federal government. 5 For example, in the relatively re-
cent case of Lowry v, Reagan,46 110 members of the House of
Representatives could not bring an a lawsuit against Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan for his actions in the Persian Gulf be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted. 47 A case of this nature raises questions as
to whether the judicial branch can interject under judicially
self-imposed justiciable limits by offering an interpretation of
certain sections of the War Powers Resolution."
B. The Provisions of the War Powers Resolution
Upon first observation, the relevant constitutional provi-
sions can mislead an observer into assigning more certainty
to the application of the constitutional war powers than a
more thorough analysis would yield.49 In reality, there has
been little consensus on the precise division of war powers
granted by the Constitution." Congress consequently felt a
compelling need to explicitly codify those powers in the War
Powers Resolution.5'
There exist two competing arguments for the president
and Congress to hold this important power. 2 Proponents of
endowing the president with this power argue that the chief
executive is capable of acting with more speed, certainty, and
secrecy than the legislature." Arguably, this may be more
beneficial in prosecuting war, 4 also, the president is often
better informed about international situations relevant to de-
cision making." Opponents of granting this power to the
president stress that Congress holds broader political consen-
sus and its structured procedures are more likely to prevent
hasty and unnecessary action. In light of the above reali-
45. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 337.
48. See discussion infra Part V.
49. Martin Wald, Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1407, 1409-10 (1984).
50. Id. at 1410.
51. Id. at 1407-08.
52. Id. at 1411.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Wald, supra note 49, at 1411.
56. Id.
2004
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ties, a tension exists between the president's flexibility and
efficiency and Congress's prudence and consensus.
57
1. Events Leading to the Passage of the War Powers
Resolution
In an environment of distrust resulting from the Vietnam
War and the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s, Congress
grew increasingly suspect of unfettered presidential power in
the foreign policy realm." Bipartisan political support stead-
ily increased in Congress for a measure that would prevent
any recurrence of a Vietnam-like conflict in the future.59
American military involvement in the latter was largely held
in disfavor not only because of low public support, but be-
cause it was an undeclared war.6 ° It was upsetting to liberals
on philosophical grounds and to realists on practical grounds
as an affront to the national interest.6' The War Powers
Resolution was the result of the Americans' disapproval with
the Nixon administration's disengagement from Vietnam and
the sudden escalation of forces and engagement in Cambo-
dia.62 Congress created the statute as a restraint on the
president and a reassertion of constitutionally granted legis-
lative powers.
2. Problems with Passage of the War Powers Resolution
The principal supporters of the Resolution "contend that
it 'restores' the original balance of war powers between the
president and the Congress."' The Resolution itself states its
purpose as "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitu-
tion of the United States."65 The principal supporters viewed
the Resolution as a necessary legislative effort to exercise
constitutional control in deciding how the nation should be
57. Id.
58. Note, supra note 3, at 645. "The Vietnam experience persuaded many
Americans that something had to be done to discourage Presidents from regard-
ing the war-making power as their private property, to be exercised at presiden-
tial will." Id. at 645 n.51 (internal citation omitted).
59. Id. at 645.
60. Andrew D. LeMar, Note, War Powers: What Are They Good For 78
IND. L.J. 1045, 1049-50 (2003).
61. Note, supra note 3, at 645.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Carter, supra note 11, at 108.
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2000).
106 Vol: 45
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committed to war.66
Opponents of the Resolution condemned the statute as an
unjustifiable usurpation by Congress of the authority of the
executive branch.67  The Resolution's opponents further ar-
gued that it was Congress's way of assigning the blame for
the Vietnam War to one administration, rather than a disas-
ter managed jointly and collectively by two presidents and
five Congresses.' Among the Resolution's adversaries was
President Richard Nixon, who vetoed the Act in 1973.69 Ulti-
mately, despite Nixon's veto, the War Powers Resolution was
enacted in 1973 and has retained its place in the federal code
to this day. °
3. The Mandates of the War Powers Resolution: A
Summary
The War Powers Resolution is laid out in nine sections,
each detailing specific requirements for its adherence. 71 By
limiting the Resolution's scope, the drafters were careful to
avoid arguments that it exceeded congressional authority."
In furtherance of this goal, the drafters wrote in the Resolu-
tion its basic objective: to preclude the president from uncon-
stitutionally committing troops again without the necessary
consent of Congress. 3
Section 3 of the Resolution attempts to accomplish this
objective by requiring that the president "in every possible
instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances."74 After the Resolution was passed, the
House committee explained that the word "hostilities" in-
cludes combat and any dispute where there is a "clear and
66. Carter, supra note 11, at 102 (citing L. Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 100-04 (1972), and Raoul Berger, War-Making by the Presi-
dent, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 30 (1972)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 108.
70. Id.
71. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
72. Carter, supra note 11, at 102-03.
73. Id. at 103.
74. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. The White House has attempted to construe the "hos-
tilities" requirement very narrowly to avoid congressional control. See Wald,
supra note 49, at 1417.
2004
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present danger of armed conflict."75
Section 4 of the Resolution requires the president, when
acting without a declaration of war, to send a report 76 to Con-
gress within forty-eight hours of introducing American forces
equipped for combat into the territory, airspace, or waters of
foreign nations. 7 This section also requires the president to
report on other information that Congress may request with
respect to committing the United States to a conflict.8  Fi-
nally, the section states that when the nation is engaged in
hostilities, the president must make periodic reports to Con-
75. Wald, supra note 49, at 1418 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong. 1st
Sess. 7 (1973)).
76. The reporting requirements are specifically detailed in 50 U.S.C. § 1543:
Reporting requirement:
(a) Written report; time of submission; circumstances necessitating
submission; information reported. In the absence of a declaration of
war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are intro-
duced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the
President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a
report, in writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or in-
volvement.
(b) Other information reported. The President shall provide such
other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of
its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Na-
tion to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Periodic reports; semiannual requirement. Whenever United
States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any
situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President
shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such
hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the
status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and du-
ration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report
to the Congress less often than once every six months.
Id.
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(b).
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gress on the status of the conflict.79 The periodic reports must
be made at least once every six months.0
Section 5 further extends the reporting requirement by
allowing the president sixty days to engage in military hos-
tilities without congressional authorization.8' The last four
presidents have found this section most troublesome because
at any time Congress has full constitutional power to pass a
law requiring the removal of United States troops from the
conflict.82  In fact the president must terminate the use of
troops unless Congress authorizes otherwise.83 Section 5 does
not apply if Congress declares war or approves such use of
the forces, allows for an extension on the sixty-day period, or
"is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States."" The sixty-day period will be ex-
tended, but only for an additional thirty days, if the "presi-
dent determines and certifies to Congress in writing that un-
avoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt re-
moval of such forces." 5
The next three sections of the War Powers Resolution de-
tail procedures for consideration of resolutions and bills to
declare war, 6 provide authorization for a deployment,87 and
allow for the recall of troops.8 The penultimate section de-
scribes the "[aluthority to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall
not be inferred... from any provision of law.. . [or] from any
79. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c).
80. Id.
81. See Carter, supra note 11, at 103. This section of the War Powers
Resolution has been controversial in the past because presidents have exploited
the sixty-day "grace" period to enter into unsupported conflicts. Id.
82. SeeWald, supra note 49, at 1419.
83. Kimpflen, supra note 7.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
85. Id. This section has been especially controversial because if Congress
wishes to order the president to withdraw troops before the end of the sixty
days, the Resolution authorizes it to do so by a concurrent resolution. See id.
Concurrent resolutions do not require the president's signature to become effec-
tive, which has led some to view the section as unconstitutional. Wald, supra
note 49, at 1419-20.
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1545.
87. 50 U.S.C. § 1546a.
88. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545-1546.
2004 109
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treaty.89 The final section describes the separability of the
Resolution, meaning that if one provision of the statute is
held invalid this determination will not affect the other provi-
sions. 9°
C. Application of War Powers Resolution: Problems with
Presidential Compliance
No president has ever expressly acknowledged the War
Powers Resolution's constitutionality, although a few presi-
dents have complied with its terms.9' The preeminent portion
of the Resolution which raises the most constitutional ques-
tions stems from Section 5's provision that if Congress wishes
to order the president to withdraw troops from disputes be-
fore the sixty days elapse, it may do so by concurrent resolu-
tion.9" This provision is particularly controversial because
concurrent resolutions do not require the president's signa-
ture to become effective. 93 Therefore, the provision could ar-
guably be regarded as an unconstitutional legislative veto.9"
Despite this argument, the federal courts have never held
any part of the Resolution unconstitutional,95 nor has Con-
gress ever repealed any of its provisions."
A historical account and illustration of the Resolution's
application in foreign disputes aids in evaluating the statute's
constitutionality and also highlights areas where the Resolu-
tion has failed. The history of the Resolution's effect on
presidential actions makes it clear that Congress, and the
courts if necessary, must address the statute's lack of control
89. 50 U.S.C. § 1547.
90. 50 U.S.C. § 1548.
91. See Carter, supra note 11, at 104.
92. See Wald, supra note 49, at 1419-20. "Concurrent resolutions are
passed by both houses of Congress, but are not legislative in nature and are not
presented to the president for his signature." Id. (citing Jefferson's Manual and
Rules of the House of Representatives § 396, H.R. Doc. No. 403, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1979)).
93. Id.
94. Id. Legislative vetoes have been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
95. See generally Wald, supra note 49, at 1436-39 (detailing the War Power
Resolution's experience in the courts).
96. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000). Historical background of the statute
details how the Resolution has never been repealed.
110 Vol: 45
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mechanisms and efficacy.9"
In order to analyze the Resolution's constitutionality and
effectiveness, this comment will consider its application and
effect on four international conflicts arising since its passage:
Lebanon, Grenada, the Persian Gulf, and Kosovo.98
1. Lebanon
In September 1982, President Ronald Reagan ordered
United States Marines into Lebanon as part of a multina-
tional peacekeeping force sent to maintain order after an in-
vasion by Israel." Reagan notified Congress that there was
neither an intention nor an expectation that the marines
would engage in hostilities; however, he also stated that the
right to self-defense was reserved.0 ° Reagan reported that
the troops would remain in Lebanon "only for a limited period
to meet the urgent requirements posed by the current situa-
tion."' ° Congress agreed to the deployment and made no at-
tempt to challenge it, even after several violent incidents.'
Congress reconsidered its policy after a group of marines
were killed during an exchange of fire with Lebanese rebels. 103
It then demanded that Reagan yield to the Resolution's time
limit."M  Reagan denied that Lebanon was a "hostile situa-
tion" because the attack was an isolated incident and as-
serted that any congressional limitations would weaken the
country's diplomatic position. 0'
In response, Congress introduced a bill to invoke the
sixty-day time limit, but then negotiated an agreement with
97. See discussion infra pp. 111-16.
98. There have been numerous disputes in American history concerning the
War Powers Resolution. However, these particular four were picked due to of
their historical significance, as well as their ability to highlight problems with
the Resolution.
99. Wald, supra note 49, at 1423.
100. Id. (quoting Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Reporting on United States Participation in the Multi-
national Force in Lebanon, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1238, 1238 (Sept. 29, 1982)).
101. Id. (quoting Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Reporting on United States Participation in the Multi-
national Force in Lebanon, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1238, 1238 (Sept. 29, 1982)).
102. Id. One major incident was a car-bombing of the United States Em-
bassy, which killed more than sixty people, seventeen of which were American
citizens.
103. Id. at 1424.
104. Id.
105. Wald, supra note 49, at 1424.
2004
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the White House that allowed the marines to remain in
Lebanon for eighteen months, although their mission would
be limited."'6 In signing the legislation, Reagan stated that he
intended to consult Congress, but it was not his constitutional
duty to follow congressional directives, such as the time limit
of the War Powers Resolution.'
After Reagan signed the negotiated agreement into law,
a suicide bomber drove a truck into a marine barrack and
killed more than 240 men.'08 This incident caused a further
decline of congressional support for the mission, but the legis-
lature found it difficult to withdraw the troops while under
fire.' 9 Numerous congressional members regretted authoriz-
ing the mission and were upset by Reagan's action that
placed them in a difficult and uncomfortable situation."
In 1984, Congressional Democrats in the House of Repre-
sentatives began to argue for a prompt withdrawal of the
forces in Lebanon."' Reagan responded by asserting that he
would ignore any such congressional dictate 12 and redeployed
troops to United States Navy ships offshore."3  Reagan re-
ported that this action was to provide support against direct
attacks towards United States troops. 114 Eventually, Reagan
discreetly reassigned the forces and formally notified Con-
gress of the termination of United States participation in the
multinational mission."' Many members of Congress consid-
ered Reagan's actions to be a violation of the terms of the
eighteen-month authorization and the War Powers Resolu-
tion because Reagan did not consult with congressional mem-
bers."6 However, Congress did not officially contravene the
106. Id. at 1424-25. A major limitation was the agreement that United
States troops would not engage in combat.
107. See Statement on Signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolu-
tion, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1422, 1422-23 (Oct. 12, 1983).
108. Wald, supra note 49, at 1426.
109. Id. This is arguably one of the main problems with the Resolution be-
cause once military forces are deployed it becomes extremely difficult for Con-
gress to withdraw them after public opinion has been established. Bill Walsh,
Congress Reluctant to Use its Power to Withdraw Troops, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Apr. 14, 1999, at A16.
110. Wald, supra note 49, at 1426.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1427.
115. Id.
116. Wald, supra note 49, at 1427.
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President's actions. 117
2. Grenada
In October 1983, troops led by the United States invaded
Grenada, supposedly in response to appeals from the Carib-
bean island nation's neighbors."' The purpose of the invasion
was to restore peace and order after a coup d'etat in which a
Marxist faction overthrew the controlling Marxist regime."'
According to President Ronald Reagan, the invasion's purpose
was to prevent Grenada from becoming a "Soviet-Cuban col-
ony ... to export terror and undermine democracy."''
Reagan presented his plans to Congress the night before
the invasion, and congressional leaders perceived this "as
more of a notification than a consultation."'21 Reagan techni-
cally observed the consultation requirement of the Resolution
by formally notifying Congress of the invasion, although he
failed to meet the sixty-day time limit of the statute.
122
The House of Representatives passed a resolution stating
that "section 4(a)(1) [time-limit provision] of the War Powers
Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, when the
United States Armed Forces were introduced into Gre-
nada." 23  The Senate also included this sentiment in an
amendment to a bill designed to raise the national debt ceil-
ing. 12  The Grenada amendment was eventually removed
from the national debt ceiling bill and the House bill never
came to the Senate floor for a vote.'25 Congress did not take
any further action on the time limit problem, possibly be-
cause administrative officials, never admitting an obligation
under the Resolution, anticipated that the troops would be
117. Id. Congress was reluctant to act because it did not want to denounce a
military operation regarding which it was unable to reach a clear consensus.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, 2 Pub. Pa-
pers 1517, 1521 (Oct. 27, 1983).
121. Wald, supra note 49, at 1428.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting 129 CONG. REC. H8884 (Oct. 31, 1983) (debate on amend-
ment to H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.); id. at H8933 (daily ed. Nov. 1,
1983) (vote adopting amendment by 403-23)).
125. Id.
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pulled in fewer than sixty days.'26 Additionally, the invasion
of Grenada proved to be politically popular. '27 While Congress
did not use the War Powers Resolution to prevent the unau-
thorized invasion, this was the first time Congress formally
invoked any portion of the Resolution.' 2 8
3. The Persian Gulf War
On August 2, 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait, President
George H.W. Bush deployed United States Armed Forces and
instituted economic sanctions against Iraq.'29 Pursuant to the
Resolution, Bush reported to Congress one week later that
the deployment was defensive in nature. 3' In particular, the
deployment was to deter further Iraqi aggression.'' By the
end of October, some members of Congress began to question
whether President Bush was acting without legislative ap-
proval or consultation; however, Congress did pass a bill pro-
viding extra funds for the troops in the Persian Gulf '2
Near the end of 1990, President Bush changed his repre-
sentation of the dispute with Iraq as offensive with approxi-
mately 230,000 troops stationed in the Persian Gulf.13  The
unilateral decision making of the Bush administration pro-
duced two unsuccessful lawsuits against the President.'
The first, Dellums v. Bush,"5 was a suit brought by fifty-
four members of Congress who opposed the President's per-
ceived encroachment upon powers constitutionally reserved
for Congress. 16 The court dismissed the action for want of
ripeness because only fifty-four members, as opposed to a ma-
jority, of Congress sought relief for an infringement of Con-
gress's war-declaration power."7 Additionally, the court dis-
126. Id. at 1428-29.
127. Wald, supra note 49, at 1428.
128. Id. at 1429.
129. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1051.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1051-52.
134. Id. at 1052.
135. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
136. Id. at 1143 n.1.
137. Id. at 1152. A ripe case is one that is ready for consideration by a court,
meaning that all other avenues for determining the case have been exhausted,
there is a real controversy, and the law needs to be settled on one or more is-
sues raised by the case. Id. at 1149.
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missed the action because the President had not yet shown a
commitment to a definitive course of action.
1 38
An American soldier initiated the second suit, Ange v.
Bush,139 alleging that Bush's deployment order exceeded his
authority. 140 The court determined that the challenges to the
President's deployment of troops presented non-justiciable
political questions.' Even if the case could have been con-
sidered justiciable, the cause of action was not ripe for judi-
cial review because it was not certain whether the President
would take further action in excess of his authority.14 ' The
court held that the determination sought by the soldier re-
garding Bush's actions was one that the judicial branch could
not make pursuant to the separation of powers embodied in
the court's equitable discretion and in the political question
doctrine. 1
43
When Bush eventually ordered the commencement of of-
fensive action in Kuwait and Iraq, Congress, for various rea-
sons including avoiding a political stalemate between the leg-
islative and executive branches, statutorily authorized war in
the Persian Gulf.' This was the first military authorization
for offensive force since World War II.1
45
4. Kosovo
In the mid-1990s, President William J. Clinton and the
United Nations began to take a serious interest in the politi-
cal changes occurring in Yugoslavia.'46 Following the final
dissolution of the country, a massive civil war began among
the varied ethnic groups in the region. 14 In March 1990,
President Clinton, lacking congressional authorization, or-
dered air and missile strikes "against the Federal Republic of
138. Id. This case demonstrates how the court used justiciability limits to
avoid making a decision regarding Congress's and the president's war-making
authority.
139. 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
140. Id. at 510.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 515.
143. Id. at 514. See discussion infra Part II.A.3 on the political question doc-
trine.
144. PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 771, 836-37 (Carolina Academic Press 1996).
145. Id. at 836.
146. See id. at 841-42.
147. Id. at 840.
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Yugoslavia to protect the province of Kosovo."4 ' President
Clinton claimed that the strikes were not defensive in nature
and that he took "these actions pursuant to my constitutional
authority to conduct United States foreign relations and as
Commander in Chief."
49
Members of Congress were aggravated by the President's
unilateral use of force, and Congressman Tom Campbell
brought suit against Clinton. 5 ' In Campbell v. Clinton,1
51
Campbell, along with thirty other members of Congress,
sought declaratory judgment against Clinton for his use of
force in Yugoslavia.'52 Campbell claimed that the President's
actions were unlawful under both the War Powers Clause of
the Constitution5 ' and the War Powers Resolution. 154 The
district court dismissed Campbell's case on non-justiciability
grounds due to lack of standing. 1 5 The court reasoned that
Campbell had sufficient opportunity to use the legislative
process to stop the President's war activity, and he therefore
lacked the power to challenge such executive action in
court.5  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.157
D. The War Powers Resolution Today
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have been fol-
lowed by many political changes. One change is the unprece-
dented centralization of power into the executive branch
when dealing with terrorism at home and abroad."8 Presi-
148. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1052 (citing Letter to Congressional Leaders
Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. DoC. 527, 527-28
(Mar. 26, 1999)).
149. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Ser-
bian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35
WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 527, 528 (Mar. 26, 1999). See also U.S. CONST. art
II § 2, cl. 1 ("[tlhe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States").
150. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2000).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 20.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the sole authority to de-
clare war).
154. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
155. Id. at 19.
156. Id. at 32.
157. Id. at 19.
158. See Nancy Kassop, The War Power and Its Limits, 33 PRESIDENTIAL
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dent George W. Bush defined the terrorist attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, as "acts of war,"5 9 and his response was to
implement domestic and foreign policies aimed at protecting
America from any future aggression.' Congress, with the
Bush administration's influence, expedited passage of legisla-
tion that granted the executive branch vast new powers.16'
For example, U.S.A. Patriot Act,1" use-of-force resolutions,1
an executive order authorizing military tribunals,'66 and a
new National Security Strategy"' have given the executive
branch expansive authority in the war powers area."
The emergence of these new laws and the executive
branch's characterization of Bush as a wartime president
have led to strong executive dictate with regard to foreign
policy. 67 Although congressional authorization allowed Bush
to send United States troops into Iraq for a second time, it is
unclear how he would respond in the event Congress refused
STUDIES QUARTERLY 509, 511 (2003).
159. Id. at 509. "By characterizing the September 2001 attacks as 'acts of
war,' where war had been declared upon the United States by A] Qaeda terror-
ists, he termed himself a 'wartime president,' and looked to the authority that
flows to presidents during such periods." Id.
160. Id. at 510 (citing David Von Drehel, Bush Walks a Thin .7Yghtrope of
Expansive Goals, WASHINGTON POST, March 21, 2003, at A22).
161. Id. at 511.
162. H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., 147 Cong. Rec. S10969 (2001).
The [Patriot] Act gives federal officials greater authority to track
and intercept communications, both for law enforcement and foreign
intelligence gathering purposes .... It seeks to further close our
boarders to foreign terrorists and to detain and remove those within
our boarders. It creates new crimes, new penalties, and new proce-
dural efficiencies for use against domestic and international terror-
ists.
CRS Report for Congress, The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch, at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf (last viewed Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with
the Santa Clara Law Review).
163. See Kassop, supra note 158, at 513 (the president is able to use force
against terrorists groups who plan, commit, or aid in attacks).
164. Id. at 517. Bush "provided final decision-making authority for the tri-
bunals in the president or the secretary of defense, and sought no input from
Congress." Id. at 518.
165. Id. at 520-23. A year after the September 11th attacks President Bush
devised a new National Security Strategy for the country, which in large part
stressed the importance of preemptive action against terrorist and rogue states.
166. See, e.g., id. at 517. President Bush's military order on detention and
tribunals "is an especially good example that illustrates all of the features iden-
tified above as the hallmarks of an unilateralist strategy in war policy making
by a president that pushes the limits of the law." Id
167. Id.
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to authorize his actions. 68 President Bush's actions are open
to questioning in light of mounting inquires concerning the
original justification for invading Iraq, specifically the sup-
posed possession of illegal weapons of mass destruction.
169
The state of war against covert enemies and the resulting
measures aimed at national security have once again called
America to consider the War Powers Resolution for its effec-
tiveness and constitutionality.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The War Powers Resolution's existence has been fraught
with deliberation over the statute's constitutionality, use, and
effectiveness. 7 0 Both opponents and supporters of the Reso-
lution agree that a significant part of the debate surrounds
the Framers' original intent. 7 ' The Resolution's opponents
have argued that it upsets the original balance of the consti-
tutionally defined war powers between the president and
Congress, 72 while supporters of the Resolution contend that it
restores the original balance that has been transformed over
time.' This comment will analyze the two sides' arguments
and recommend changes that need to be made in order for the
Resolution to be a more operative and effective legislative
mandate.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Presenting the Arguments on the War Powers
Resolution's Constitutionality
The War Powers Resolution's opponents claim that it is
an unconstitutional restraint on the president's power.1
Proponents, on the other hand, argue that the War Powers
Resolution is not only constitutional, but necessary to ensure
the separation of powers doctrine conceptualized by the
168. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1046.
169. Michiko Kakutani, Controversial Reports Become Accepted Wisdom,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, September 28, 2004, at p. 4 .
170. See Carter, supra note 11, at 108.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 108-09.
173. Id. at 108.
174. Id.
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Framers of the Constitution. " " Both arguments have merit,
although for the reasons described below, the arguments
supporting the Resolution are more persuasive.
1. The Framers'Intent
Generally, opponents and proponents of the War Powers
Resolution agree that both the Articles of Confederation and
the original draft of the Constitution granted Congress broad
discretion in the conduct of war, but in the course of the Con-
stitutional Convention, the Framers retooled the balance in
favor of a system with shared war powers.'7 6
Opponents of the Resolution, who defend an independent
presidential war-making power, claim that the rejection of
the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution's original
draft, which favored Congress, is evidence that the Framers
intended for Congress to have less power."' Further they
contend, the Framers must have understood that there had
been and would continue to be many instances in which the
president can react to hostilities without a declaration of
war.'7  Acting in such times, the president should have the
greatest power to control the American forces, thus alleviat-
ing the "need to develop a national consensus on every tacti-
cal issue that might arise.'7 9
In contrast, proponents of the War Powers Resolution
more convincingly argue that the Framers would have been
strongly opposed to the president taking unilateral military
action without congressional authorization.' 0 However, the
Framers would have supported instances "when the United
States or its troops abroad were suddenly attacked and the
president needed to repel such attacks."8 ' The proponents'
argument is better founded because action taken in self-
defense allows for a preservation of international policy and
enables congressional consideration on whether to conduct
war.8 2 The proponents' argument meets the important sepa-
175. Id.
176. See Carter, supra note 11, at 110.
177. Id. at 109.
178. Carter, supra note 11, at 110 (internal citation omitted).
179. Id. at 111.
180. Id. at 110.
181. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1054.
182. Id. (quoting Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 11, at 20 (2000)).
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ration of powers requirement that the Framers incorporated
throughout the Constitution.
18 3
In addition, the Resolution's proponents persuasively
stress the Framers' concern following their experience with
British colonialism over the abuses inherent in vesting abso-
lute power in any one individual.TM Proponents contend that
where war powers are concerned, the Framers preferred a
more balanced system of decision making, one that fostered
deliberation instead of autocracy.'85 The strength of the pro-
ponent's theory lies in language expressly written in the Con-
stitution that grants the president the authority to command
the military once in conflicts, but not to direct its involvement
into conflicts. 8 '
2. Congressional Checks on Presidential War-Making
Powers
Opponents also look to other arguments beyond the
Framers' original intent and have contended that Congress
has several other options available to enforce its constitu-
tional authority over the president.' 7 Congress could employ
the power of the purse and cut off funds the president is us-
ing to support military operations.' Congress could also
take more extreme measures and attempt to impeach the
president.' Opponents argue that if the president is truly
acting outside of his given constitutional authority, the sys-
tem of checks and balances will prevail and he or she will be
removed from office. 90
The Resolution's proponents on the other hand, contend
that these additional methods of congressional control over
the president are too insubstantial to counterbalance execu-
183. The Founding Fathers' intent was to provide a strict system of checks
and balances on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. An example of
this may be found in Congress's enumerated war powers contrasted with the
president's vast foreign policy powers. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 281.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11. These provi-
sions assert that Congress may declare war and the president may command
the troops once the country is engaged in war.
187. Carter, supra note 11, at 110-11 (discussing Eugene V. Rostow's argu-
ment that the Resolution is not needed).
188. Id. at 111.
189. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1058.
190. Id.
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tive abuses. 91 These contentions assert the reality that once
a military action is initiated abroad, it is very difficult for
Congress to recall the troops.'92 It would be extremely coun-
terproductive and embarrassing internationally and domesti-
cally for Congress to withhold funds or attempt to impeach
the president after troops have been committed.'93 This line
of action could bring the United States global ridicule and
cause significant strife among the American public.' Fur-
thermore, the strength in this argument lies in the simple
fact that the text of the Constitution explicitly gives Congress
the right to declare war and to "raise and support Armies...
[and] to provide and maintain a Navy."'95 The president, on
the other hand, is explicitly named the "Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy."'96 Therefore, it is only after Congress
declares war, or statutorily authorizes a military operation,
that the president may assume command of the armed
forces. "
B. Overall Resolution of Argument
The strengths and weaknesses of the two constitutional
arguments establish that the Resolution is constitutional.99
The Resolution, at the time of inception, was an acceptable
measure taken by Congress to interpret the Constitution and
ensure checks and balances within the federal government."'
It continues to be so today.
To imagine that the Framers of the Constitution would
have allowed a president to take unilateral military action
without congressional assent seems almost absurd, °° espe-
cially in light of the overall strength of the separation of pow-
191. See Carter, supra note 11, at 112. Carter discusses the need for the
Resolution to enable Congress to act when the "President's actions slide down
the scale from use of troops in time of peace to use of troops in time of war." Id.
192. See Walsh, supra note 109, at A16.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. U.S. CONST. art I. § 8.
196. U.S. CONST. art II. § 2, cl. 1.
197. Id.
198. See generally Carter, supra note 11. Carter's major assertion is that the
Resolution is constitutional.
199. Id. at 134. The Resolution "guarantees that unless the Congress of the
United States gives its approval, all of that awesome power will not be concen-
trated in the hands of a single individual." Id.
200. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1054.
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ers doctrine. This contention is particularly evident in the
amount of constitutional control over the initiation and sup-
port of military operations that the Framers conferred to
Congress, compared to the relatively limited control the Con-
stitution bestows the president.21' These facts suggest that
the Framers would support a law requiring the president to
consult with Congress before committing United States
Armed Forces to military actions abroad. The facts further
suggest that the consultation provision of the Resolution
20 2
should be strengthened or at least asserted by Congress.
Furthermore, although it is important for the United
States to respond quickly to adverse situations abroad and at
home, this alone should not give the president unfettered
power to direct the armed forces in any manner he or she sees
fit.211 Congress, and the nation, should have a say in what
actions the president takes in the name of the United States.
As evidenced by past conflicts,"°1 what starts as a simple
"defensive" military operation abroad may turn into a full-
blown "war-like" dispute.20 ' When the president decides to
interject United States troops in such situations abroad,
Congress and the American public are virtually excluded
from the decision-making process, yet are left to handle the
consequences of the unilaterally induced engagement.2 6 The
War Powers Resolution attempts to alleviate these very
issues, and with appropriate changes it has potential to
become a much stronger political balancing force.
V. PROPOSAL
The history of the War Powers Resolution's implementa-
tion offers sufficient evidence of its ineffectiveness and the
legislature's overall inability to manage the problems that
result from the statute's weaknesses. 27 These past problems
201. Carter, supra note 11, at 110 (discussing Abraham Sofaer's argument
that the Framers planned to limit the president's war power authority).
202. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000).
203. Id.
204. See discussion supra Part II.C.
205. See, e.g., LeMar, supra note 60, at 1051-52 (discussing President George
H.W. Bush's entry into the Persian Gulf War as a defensive mission, which
later became a full-blown military campaign).
206. The United States' most recent engagement in Iraq is an excellent ex-
ample of this situation.
207. Note, supra note 3, at 637.
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and current presidential indiscretions clearly show that the
statute must be modified.28  The Resolution should be
strengthened by a congressional amendment, stronger con-
gressional action, or more specific judicial interpretations of
the statute as it currently stands. If Congress wishes to reas-
sert its constitutionally defined role in determining when the
United States should become involved in military activities,
the Resolution must be revised.
A congressional amendment of the War Powers Resolu-
tion would be one way to alleviate difficulties concerning the
statute. In doing so, Congress must address two main issues.
First, it must make the consultation and reporting require-
ment stricter, and second, it must provide a more detailed
definition of "hostilities" within the Resolution.9
In order to achieve these goals, Congress should first
amend section 41 of the War Powers Resolution to make it
more exacting. Currently, this provision calls for the presi-
dent to consult with Congress prior to engaging United States
troops into hostilities.211 The historical account of this statute
detailed above 12 suggests that some presidents have regarded
the consultation requirement as a mere notification require-
ment.213 To avoid this, the wording of the Resolution must be
changed, requiring the president to present to Congress the
justifications for entering into hostilities abroad before he or
she takes action. These modifications would require the
president to assemble military experts and thoroughly evalu-
ate the ramifications of military involvement. Congress
should then vote on whether this is a dispute that United
States Armed Forces should enter. The wording should also
propose specific actions Congress could take if the president
fails to meet this section of the Resolution. Congress would
then have a clear guideline of the procedures to follow when
the president violates the Resolution.
This amendment would also be beneficial because it
would allow Congress to have a bearing on the United States'
208. See discussion supra Part II.D.
209. Seeid. at 648-51.
210. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000).
211. Id.
212. See discussion supra Part II.C.
213. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 49, at 1428. President Reagan informed
Congress of his plans to invade Grenada the night before the invasion. Id.
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actions abroad before troops are committed overseas.21 4 Al-
though this extra time spent by Congress determining
whether there should be troop involvement would take more
time than is currently used by the president alone; the addi-
tional deliberations and investigations are justified when
lives are at risk, foreign policy is upset, and a significant
amount of taxpayer money is spent on foreign disputes.
Congress should also add a section to the War Powers
Resolution, or perhaps create another statute altogether, that
more clearly defines "hostilities" within the Resolution.215 Af-
ter the Resolution was passed the House committee explained
that the word "hostilities" includes combat and also any dis-
pute where there is a "clear and present danger of armed con-
flict. '216 With technological advancements and the transfor-
mation in war tactics, it is vital that the legislature better
define "war" and "hostilities" to reflect the changes that have
taken place with the emergence of influential terrorists
groups.217 If Congress expands the scope of the meaning of
"hostilities" to include the United States perspective of
"smaller" operations that in reality have large influences
throughout the world, it will have more control on what ac-
tions the president takes. 28 Furthermore, the American pub-
lic will be better informed with regard to the United States'
involvement abroad. Finally, the word "hostilities" should
also include situations when the United States enters into a
dispute as a peaceful or self-defensive action, because in
219
many of these cases the dispute turns offensive.
Congress must also begin to take a more active role in
the enforcement of the War Powers Resolution to make it a
stronger piece of legislation.220 In order to make foreign policy
more representative of the American public's interests, it is
214. See Walsh, supra note 109, at A16.
215. See Note, supra note 3, at 648-51 (discussing the need for a better defini-
tion of hostilities).
216. Wald, supra note 49, at 1418 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong. 1st
Sess. 7 (1973)).
217. See generally Kassop, supra note 158 (discussing the war on terror and
the drastic changes September 11th has made to the defintion of war).
218. These "smaller" operations should include any solitary military action
the United States takes abroad, which would allow for more public influence in
the course of action taken.
219. Wald, supra note 49, at 1418 (citing Conf. Rep. No. 547 93d Cong. 1st
Sess. 8, at 62 (1973)).
220. See LeMar, supra note 60, at 1067.
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necessary that Congress become more proactive in deciding
when United States troops should engage in military actions
abroad. Often, the general public verbalizes concerns with
presidential actions in the area of foreign policy, but its con-
cerns are not fully recognized by the executive branch.22'
Congress needs to better consider its constituents' wishes and
address presidential actions in foreign policy by enforcing the
War Powers Resolution.
More particularly, Section 5 of the War Powers Resolu-
tion222 should be strictly enforced by Congress to remove
United States Armed Forces at any time during troop in-
volvement.23 The legislature could take more control over the
president's actions if it is diligent about using this provision
of the Resolution.224 If a significant number of congressional
members disagree with the president's actions, they should
pass a concurrent resolution to remove the troops at any time
during their involvement in the dispute.25 This action would
be especially useful in instances where the American public
largely disapproves of United States involvement in hostili-
ties; it would also allow Congress to meet its constituents'
needs by removing the troops before it becomes logistically
difficult to do so.2
Finally, the War Powers Resolution can become more ef-
fective if the judiciary is able to better interpret specific pro-
visions of the statute.2 7  Future cases must be brought by
plaintiffs in such a way as to avoid dismissal on justiciable
grounds, such as constituting a political question, lack of
standing, or lack of ripeness.228 In order to escape such dis-
missal, cases need to center on the meaning of the words
within the statute, rather than on alleged presidential ac-
221. This again has been seen in the most recent United States involvement
in Iraq. Many citizens do not agree with President George W. Bush's further
involvement with the nation. A May 24, 2004 ABCNEWS/Washington Post Poll
indicated that fifty-eight percent of Americans disapprove of President Bush's
handling of the Iraq War. See
http://www.abcnews.go.com/images/pdf/955alBushlraqElection.pdf (last visited
01/02/2005) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
222. 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2000).
223. LeMar, supra note 60, at 1057.
224. Id.
225. 50 U.S.C. § 1544.
226. See Walsh, supra note 109, at A16.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
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tions.229 If courts could better interpret the meaning of words
within the Resolution, such as "consult"23 ° or "hostilities,"
23'
the expectations of the president's actions would be more
clearly defined. Thus, Congress would know when the presi-
dent fails to meet the Resolution's requirements and could
legitimately act in response to indiscretions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The world today is a different place as compared to 1973,
when the War Powers Resolution was passed. As drastic
changes have taken place in the United States and the world
at large, it is now even more imperative that both the execu-
tive and the legislative branches of the government deter-
mine the federal government's foreign policy decisions. 32
In order to safeguard the United States from unilateral
and hasty decision making, certain provisions of the War
Powers Resolution should be amended. The Resolution
should also be better enforced and interpreted, in order to be
a more effective statute. These changes to the Resolution
would help reinforce the United States' position as a world
leader, while at the same time respecting the global trend of
multilateral foreign policy and decision making.
229. See, e.g., Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
230. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 49, at 1428 (discussing President Reagan's
lack of consultation with Congress before invading Granada).
231. See Note, supra note 3, at 648-51.
232. See Carter, supra note 11, at 115-16. Carter discusses the importance
of a fluid system of separation of powers that places "limits on what each
branch can do to control the others." Id. at 115.
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